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For many decisions, timing is crucial. For decisions with potential environmental impacts,
the timing of an action will be aﬀected by the extent to which the decision maker bears all
the potential costs or beneﬁts of a decision, and legal liability rules provide incentives that
may alter the timing of decisions. This paper extends the economic literature on liability
rules by focusing on their eﬀects on the timing of decisions that impose potential negative
externalities on others, and draws on the existing economic theory of optimal timing of
investment, forest rotation decisions under uncertainty. The model is developed around the
issues of prescribed ﬁre use and wildﬁre risk mitigation, two related issues that are regularly
in the news but have not received much attention in the economics literature.
The use of prescribed ﬁre faced strong resistance from policy makers and natural resource
managers through much of the 20th century (Pyne 1982, Biswell 1989), but is increasingly
recognized as a useful tool to increase rangeland and forest productivity, biodiversity, and
to reduce wildﬁre risk and severity (Bernardo et al. 1988, Svejcar 1989, Briggs and Knapp
1995, Zimmerman 1997, Babbitt 1995, Pattison 1998). The Federal government now formally
recognizes the use of prescribed ﬁre as an integral element of wildﬁre management (U.S.
Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of Agriculture 1995), and the use of prescribed
ﬁre on federal land is increasing. Haines et al. (1998) report that the number of national
forests using prescribed ﬁre increased by 76 percent between 1985 and 1994 (Shaver 2000).
About 900,000 acres of Federal land was treated with prescribed ﬁre in 1995, and the acreage
had increased to 2.2 million acres by 1999 (National Interagency Fire Center 2001).
Nonetheless, prescribed burning is an inherently risky resource management tool. A
prescribed ﬁre set by the US National Park Service near Los Alamos, New Mexico in May
2000 resulted in a 48,000-acre wildﬁre, destroying about 220 homes and aﬀecting about 400
1families (Claims Magazine Staﬀ Writer 2000). Litigation resulting from an escaped wildﬁre
can be costly and time-consuming as well. For example, the plaintiﬀ in a case (Lowe vs
Jones et al., Case No. CJ 95-345) tried in Osage County, Oklahoma argued for $9.3 million
in damages in a 200-acre wildﬁre that the plaintiﬀ claimed resulted from a prescribed burn
on adjacent property. No structures were burned, only grassland. Although no judgement
was found for the plaintiﬀ, legal and other fees for the defense approached $0.5 million.
In the absence of statutory law, the Common Law relating to prescribed ﬁre is generally
based upon negligence: to be found liable for damage to a neighbor’s property, the burner
must be found to not have taken a reasonable level of precaution to reduce the likelihood of
damage to the neighbor’s property (25 ALR5th 391). Today, virtually all states have codiﬁed
civil or criminal statutory law for prescribed burning, but the structure of these laws varies
substantially across states. Only four states impose strict liability on prescribed burners
such that they are liable for the damage caused by an escaped prescribed ﬁre regardless
of the precautions they take to control the ﬁre. Most states with prescribed ﬁre statutes
impose negligence rules of some form on the prescribed burner, but again, these negligence
rules vary substantially across states. In some states, losing control of a prescribed ﬁre is
prima facie evidence of negligence. In others, the burden of proof is on the plaintiﬀ to show
the negligence of the individual who performed the prescribed ﬁre. Not only do prescribed
burning laws vary substantially across states, but these laws currently are in ﬂux. The laws
in most states have been revised since 1990, and a number of statutes are currently under
review.
A model of the incentive eﬀects of basic liability alternatives on prescribed ﬁre use,
precaution, and timing is developed. The model builds on a previous paper by Yoder et al.
(2003) that examines the comparative advantages of various liability rules and regulatory
2regimes for addressing prescribed ﬁre risk. Because prescribed ﬁre is often used to mitigate
wildﬁre risk (Prestemon et al. 2001, Loomis et al. 2000), the analysis is extended to compare
the eﬃcacy of diﬀerent liability rules when prescribed ﬁre can be used to reduce the risk of
a landholding contributing to the spread of naturally occurring wildﬁre. The model is then
applied to an empirical examination of prescribed ﬁre use and risk in the United States.
Data for all prescribed ﬁres are not currently available, but annual, state-level estimates of
the number and average size of escaped prescribed ﬁres are available. These data are used
here to show the eﬀect of variation in the stringency of liability and related statutory law
on the incidence of escaped prescribed ﬁres.
The next section begins with a model of eﬃcient prescribed ﬁre use, and then proceeds to
examine the incentives and implications associated with strict liability and negligence rules.
Wildﬁre risk is then introduced to show how it changes the eﬃcient use of prescribed ﬁre in
relation to each liability rule.
2 A model of prescribed ﬁre use and timing
Prescribed ﬁre use is modelled as a modiﬁed Faustmann rotation problem in which the
landowner maximizes the net present value of all future ﬁre rotations by choosing the length
of time between prescribed burns. In addition to timing, two other precautionary inputs are
available: mitigation of potential damage, and precautionary eﬀort to reduce the probability
of unintentional damage occurring (the importance of the distinction between these two
inputs will become apparent in the discussion of liability). Given the burner’s private optimal
input use and timing, the burner pursues a prescribed ﬁre rotation if his private expected
net present value of doing so is positive, but does not if the expected net present value is
nonpositive.
3A number of speciﬁcations for the time-path of prescribed ﬁre beneﬁts, and probabilities
of prescribed ﬁre escapes, and damage speciﬁcations are possible. It is assumed here that
beneﬁts from land productivity, R(t), are received in the period of production rather than
at the end of a rotation as in a standard timber rotation model. This speciﬁcation more
closely resembles the beneﬁt stream from prairie upon which forage beneﬁts or wildlife ben-
eﬁts accrue.1 The value of one rotation of prescribed ﬁre of a given size, viewed from the
perspective of the end of a rotation, is modelled in the following way:








− D(V )P(B,T) − W
bB, (1)
where
• t is a time index starting at the completion of the last ﬁre, and T is denotes the time
at which the prescribed ﬁre is performed.
• R(t) is the value of production for the tth year after the last burn.
R T
0 R(t)e−rtdt is
therefore the stream of beneﬁts between ﬁres.
• V represents investment in mitigation of potential damage. W v is the marginal cost of
investment. The investment is assumed to be made at the beginning of each rotation.
• D(V ) is potential damage, or the level of damage in the event that damage occurs.
This damage may include the additional costs incurred for extinguishing a wildﬁre that
would not have been incurred otherwise, but for the purposes of this paper these costs
are assumed exogenous and implicit in D(V ).
1In a timber production setting, the decision could be modelled as a nested rotation problem with two
state variables: one representing the time from the last harvest, and one representing the time from the last
prescribed ﬁre.
4• B is the level of precautionary eﬀort exerted to control a prescribed ﬁre when one is
performed, and W b is the marginal cost of prescribed ﬁre precautionary eﬀort.
• P(B,t) is the probability of damage given a ﬁre in period t and precaution B. If a
ﬁre in period t starts by natural causes (unintentional), then B = 0, which is to say
that no prescribed burn preparation is performed. P(0,t) is the probability of a ﬁre in
period t causing damage to neighboring property given no precaution by the landowner
(B = 0).
• r is the discount rate.
The term “timing” and its index t are used for clarity, but it can be considered to
represent a vector of characteristics that changes over time related to both the value and the
volatility of the vegetation.
The present value of all future rotations is then:2









The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a maximum of this expected present value func-
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−rTDV(V )P(B,T) ≤ W
v (3b)
−D(V )PB(B,T) ≤ W
b (3c)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Condition 3a is the ﬁrst-order condition for the
optimal timing to perform a prescribed burn, and is essentially a Faustmann-type result.
The left-hand side is the expected beneﬁt of waiting to perform a prescribed burn in period
T (or the opportunity cost of burning), net the change in expected damage at time T. The
right hand side represents the opportunity cost of waiting (or the beneﬁts of not waiting).
This includes the usual Faustmann rent term [rPV (·)] minus the value of expected damage
and precaution costs in period T. Condition 3b shows that damage mitigation eﬀort V is
performed such that the marginal cost of mitigation [W v] is equated to the present value
of the marginal expected beneﬁt of mitigation given the the possibility of prescribed ﬁre.
Condition 3c shows that during the prescribed burning, the expected marginal reduction in
damage from prescribed burning precaution is equated with the marginal cost of precaution
during a prescribed burn.
One important characteristic of prescribed ﬁre risk is seasonality. Over the course of a
number of years, there are likely to be a number of local optima, and functions corresponding
to the “marginal beneﬁt of waiting” and the “marginal cost of waiting” could conceivably
cross numerous times as well. The ﬁrst-order condition for T can be interpreted as a switching
condition applicable to a dynamic programming framework (Thomson 1992).3
3the problem of asset replacement under uncertainty has a similar structure. Recent papers by (Dixit
et al., Willassen 1998, Sødal 2002) on optimal investment focus on problems in which the change in the value
of investment over time follows a Markov Process. The structure of uncertainty is diﬀerent here in that a
6Figure 1: Present value stream of beneﬁts and expected damage over time. Top: levels.
Bottom: marginals.
Figure 1 shows one plausible stream of the present value of beneﬁts and costs from a
prescribed ﬁre in which timing across years and within years matters. The cyclical nature
of ﬁre risk is very important for prescribed burning and is represented by the annual cycle
of the expected damage functions. Vegetation growth is usually cyclic as well, but this cycle
is omitted for clarity. Also in the ﬁgure, both the beneﬁts and the risk of ﬁre use grows
as vegetation matures, but that the vegetation growth temporally leads ﬁre damage risk
deterministic evolution of the expected value function is assumed, but the agent faces the possibility that a
catastrophic event will end a rotation and reduce the value of the resource.
7in terms of the long term trend. This lag in ﬁre damage risk thus provides a window for
maximizing the net value of prescribed burning that disappears after a number of years
(“Burn early and burn often” is a common motto among prescribed ﬁre professionals). The
marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost curves cross virtually every year, but it is in the third year
(t=3.24) that the beneﬁts of a prescribed burn are maximized. If a burn is not performed at
that time, then in any given year there is local optimum for performing a prescribed burn.4
3 Timing and care under strict liability and negligence
The previous section presents the foundation of the model of prescribed ﬁre timing and
precautionary incentives, and provides the necessary conditions for eﬃcient timing and dam-
age mitigation and precaution by participants. The focus of this section is a comparison of
timing and precautionary incentives under strict liability versus a negligence standard.
In the previous section, the incidence of beneﬁts, damage costs, and mitigation costs
between participants is ignored. In this section, the beneﬁts and costs are distributed as
follows. The burner bears all beneﬁts [
R T
0 R(t)dt] from ﬁres. To maintain a focus on the
externality eﬀects associated with cross-boundary spread of ﬁre, deﬁne P(B,t) as the proba-
bility of a ﬁre (prescribed or otherwise) spreading to a neighbor’s land and inﬂicting damage
on the neighbor’s property. Investment in mitigation of potential damage, V , is performed
by the victim, and precautionary eﬀort, B, is performed by the prescribed burner when a
prescribed ﬁre is performed.
To begin, assume that a two-dimensional negligence standard is set at the eﬃcient level
4Given multiple optima and a cyclical ﬁre risk, the assumptions PBt > 0 and Ptt < 0 no longer strictly
hold for all t. However, it is reasonable to assume that at the chosen T under each liability rule, PT > 0,
which implies that expected damage is increasing at the margin. Then PBT > 0, assuming that precaution
and burning early are technical complements for risk reduction.
8Figure 2: Precaution and timing under a negligence rule. Left: precaution given a prescribed
ﬁre. Right: timing of a prescribed ﬁre.
according to ﬁrst-order conditions 3a and 3c for timing (¯ T = T ∗) and precaution, ( ¯ B = B∗).
If the burner satisﬁes these standards, he does not bear the damage costs if a ﬁre escapes.
In order to maximize his own private net beneﬁts, the burner will choose exactly precaution
level ¯ B and timing ¯ T in order to satisfy the standard at minimum cost. This result is shown
in ﬁgure 2 (left panel), in which discontinuities in the expected damage functions for both
B and T induce eﬃcient precaution.5 Notice, however, that unlike the standard on ¯ B, ¯ T
is a two sided standard — the burner must not burn too early, nor too late, or he will be
forced by the court to bear the costs of an escaped ﬁre (This result is shown in ﬁgure 2, right
panel, ¯ T). Under the assumption of full information, the victim knows that the burner has
the incentive to satisfy the negligence standard and expects to incur any damage sustained.
The victim therefore has an incentive to perform eﬃcient damage mitigation V ∗.
This exact form of negligence rule ¯ T at V ∗, is generally not implemented, arguably due
to high information costs. Instead, aspects of prescribed ﬁre law appear more similar to a
5This argument follows Brown (1973) and others since.
9“Learned Hand” negligence rule in which a burner is found negligent if the net social beneﬁt
is nonpositive, e.g. to the right of ¯ T LH in ﬁgure 2. A negligence rule set at ¯ T LH will tend to
induce excessively long rotation lengths, leading to higher than optimal expected damage.
In contrast to negligence rules, strict liability rule requires the burner fully reimburses
the neighbor for damage. Under this rule, the neighbor has no incentive to exert damage
mitigation eﬀort; his private beneﬁts of doing so are zero because he is fully reimbursed
for any damage incurred. Therefore, potential damage under a strict liability rule is at it’s
maximum: D(0) = Dmax. If the eﬃcient level of V is larger than zero, potential damage
under a strict liability rule will be higher than under a negligent rule.
4 Implications for the incidence of escaped prescribed
ﬁres
Landowners respond diﬀerently to strict liability and negligence rules. The number of
landowners choosing to perform prescribed ﬁres will diﬀer, and their timing and precaution
levels will diﬀer. Under a strict liability rule, potential damage will be higher than the
eﬃcient level. Under a negligence rule, burners do not bear the damage from an escaped
prescribed ﬁre at all given that they satisfy the negligence standard, so expected damage
costs to the burner are zero. According to the Envelope Theorem, the eﬀect of an increase







This may aﬀect whether a landowner ﬁnds it in his interest to perform prescribed ﬁre
rotations in exactly the same way that zero proﬁts induces a ﬁrm to shut down in a simple
model of the ﬁrm. If the beneﬁts from prescribed burning vary from landholding to land-
10holding and expected net present value of prescribed ﬁre rotations can be nonpositive, fewer
landowners will choose to pursue prescribed ﬁre practices at all under a strict liability rule
than when neighbors have a stronger incentive to mitigate potential damage. This leads to
the ﬁrst of several implications from the model that are tested empirically in the following
section:
Proposition 1. Fewer landowners will use prescribed ﬁre under strict liability than an eﬃ-
cient negligence rule.
Consider now the eﬀects of the diﬀerence in expected damage costs under strict liability












[(PT − rP)PBT + PB(H11/D(V ))] ≶ 0 (6)
where |H| > 0 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix for the problem and H11 < 0 is
the upper left element of HBoth of these results are indeterminate. However, if the risk of
escape is increasing rapidly (PT large) and/or the probability of escape is low (P(B,T) low,
then rotation lengths will be shorter and precaution usage will be higher where D is large;
burners will burn early before the risk gets too high. By doing so, the marginal product of
precaution tends to be lower, and precautionary eﬀort may be lower than it would be later.
On the other hand, if a potential burner already is in a situation with mature, hard-to-control
fuel loads, large potential damage induces a longer wait and, when a prescribed ﬁre is used,
more precautionary eﬀort. In these situations, however, it is also more likely that the net
expected beneﬁts of prescribed ﬁre will be negative and a prescribed ﬁre rotation will not
11be utilized at all.6
In summary, strict liability leads to less (zero) risk mitigation by neighbors than an
eﬃcient negligence rule, so D(V ) is larger, leading in turn to shorter rotation lengths in
young, rapidly growing fuel loads, or longer rotation lengths if landowners ﬁnd themselves
with more mature, coarse vegetation.
These diﬀerences in rotation length and precaution aﬀect the probability of an escape
given that a ﬁre is started. Based on the comparative statics results 5, the change in P(B,T)






















The second and third terms in the sum are negative. The ﬁrst term will be negative unless
rP > PT. Because potential damage will be larger under strict liability, the endogenous
probability of escape under strict liability will tend to be smaller than under an eﬃcient
negligence rule unless the probability of escape is very high relative to the change in the
probability of escape over time.
Proposition 2. A strict liability rule will tend to induce a smaller endogenous probability
of escape than a negligence rule.
6In the simple case where T is the only choice variable, then the comparative static results turns entirely
on rP − PT. If P is increasing at a rate smaller than r, then the rotation lengths will be longer for large
D. If P is increasing at a rate larger than r, then an increase in D leads to a decrease in rotation length T.
According to equation 5 the use of the input B makes it more likely that rotation lengths will be shorter as
D increases. Similarly, in the single input case with B, dB
dD(V ) > 0. With rotation length T as an additional
choice variable, only a large probability of damage will induce decreasing T to the point where the marginal
product of B is smaller than before the increase in D.
125 Wildﬁre risk and prescribed ﬁre timing
An important element of wildﬁre risk mitigation is fuel load management, and a crucial factor
in wildﬁre risk is the volume and characteristics of the vegetation as a fuel load. Because
plants grow over time and in doing so change in terms of ﬁre ignition and ﬁre intensity
potentials, a dynamic approach is called for that accounts for these changes over time. The
decision whether or not to perform a prescribed ﬁre then becomes a decision about when,
if ever, to burn. The Faustmann-type model is extended here to account for wildlife risk.
This section draws on Englin et al. (2000) and Reed (1984), who develop similar models of
optimal timber harvest in the face of wildﬁre risk.
The timing of prescribed burning matters to the neighbor for two reasons: ﬁrst, perform-
ing a prescribed burn reduces the fuel load on the burner’s land, and thereby may change the
probability of a wildﬁre occurring on the burners land, thus reducing the probability of a ﬁre
spreading onto the neighbor’s land. Therefore prescribed burning provides positive expected
beneﬁts to the neighbor in terms of a reduction in wildﬁre risk. Of course, prescribed burn-
ing is risky as well, and the probability of a prescribed ﬁre escaping onto the neighbors land
depends in part on the intensity of the prescribed ﬁre. Fire intensity is in turn dependent on
the coarseness and volume of the fuel load, both which tend in many vegetative systems to
increase over time. Thus, generally speaking, the longer a prescribed burn is postponed, the
higher the probability of escape for any given level of precautionary eﬀort by the burner.
Consider two scenarios: One in which a prescribed ﬁre is performed that consumes veg-
etative fuel before a wildﬁre occurs, and one in which a wildﬁre occurs by natural causes
before a prescribed ﬁre is performed. Using notation similar to Englin et al. (2000), let
Y (X,T,V,B) be the value of one rotation (ﬁre to ﬁre). X is a variable representing the
duration between either a prescribed ﬁre or a wildﬁre; it is a random variable because the
13occurrence of a wildﬁre is a random event. T, V , and B are deﬁned as before. If a wildﬁre
precedes the date chosen for a prescribed ﬁre then the rotation is cut short by a wildﬁre and
X < T. If the rotation is completed with a prescribed ﬁre, then X = T. The two possible







0 R(t)e−rtdt − W vV

− D(V )P(0,X) if X < T
erT
R T
0 R(t)e−rtdt − W vV

− D(V )P(B,T) − W bB if X = T.
(7)
Given the two possible outcomes, the expected net present value of the property is the sum
of the two values times their respective probability of occurrence. Following Reed (1984, p.
189), allow wildﬁre risk to vary as a function of the age of the vegetation by assuming a non-






where λ(t) is the mean of the Poisson distribution at time t. It follows that the time
between successive wildﬁres (given no intervening prescribed burn) is F(t) = 1−e−m(t), and
the probability density function is m0(t)e−m(t) (Thomasian 1969, p.584-587). Notice also that
m0(z) = λ(z) which is the probability of a wildﬁre at any instant z, and that if λ(t) = λ,
then the Poisson distribution is unchanging (homogeneous) over time.
If a prescribed burn is performed at time T, this wildﬁre distribution is censored at time





λ(t)e−m(t) for 0 < t < T
e−m(T) for t = T
(8)
14for any chosen prescribed ﬁre rotation length T, the probability of wildﬁre occurrence before
the prescribed ﬁre is performed is Prob(X < T)=1 − e−m(T).









The numerator of PV(T,B,V ) is the expected net present value of a single rotation given



























































Eﬃcient timing T and eﬀort levels V and B are those values that satisfy the ﬁrst-order
conditions ∂PV (·)/∂T = 0, ∂PV (·)/∂B = 0, and ∂PV (·)/∂V = 0. After rearrangement
15and simpliﬁcation, these conditions can be represented as















−D(V )pB(B,T) ≥ W
b. (11c)
These ﬁrst-order conditions are not of direct concern for this paper and will not be discussed
in detail, but are provided for comparison to ﬁrst-order-conditions 3a–3c.
What is of direct interest for this paper is the impact of the liability on the timing
of prescribed burning in the presence of wildﬁre risk. A growing literature supports the
hypothesis that prescribed ﬁre can be used to reduce wildﬁre risk (Prestemon et al. 2001).
Under a strict liability rule, prescribed burners are held liable for any damage spreading
as a result of a ﬁre they start. However, such a liability rule does not impose liability for
unintentional wildﬁres spreading to neighboring land.7 This fact leads to a further diﬀerence
between eﬃcient incentive for prescribed ﬁre timing. To show this, assume in this section
only that victims cannot mitigate potential damage (this assumption simpliﬁes the formal
analysis substantially). Given this assumption, it can be shown that as change in timing








where |H| > 0 to ensure a maximum. This result suggests that if the burner ignores the
probability of wildﬁre (eﬀectively assuming it as zero rather than positive), the burner will
wait too long before performing a prescribed ﬁre. Given that a negligence standard is set
7A handful of states have negligence rules relating to the spread of wildﬁres, but this is a diﬀerent matter.
16according to ﬁrst-order conditions 11c and 11a, prescribed ﬁre rotations will be performed
(and therefore more prescribed ﬁres in any given time period).8
Proposition 3. More prescribed ﬁre, and more escaped prescribed ﬁres, will tend to occur
under an eﬃcient negligence rule relative to a strict liability rule when the risk of natural
wildﬁres is high.
6 Additional implications and extensions
Based on the same logic as proposition 4 and the hypothesis that victim mitigation will be
lower under a strict liability rule, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4. As the value of potential damage increases, the number of escaped prescribed
ﬁres decreases.
This is perhaps the most intuitively obvious result, but it has implications about where
prescribed ﬁres will be set and the extent of precaution in various settings. For example,
vegetation management may be crucial on the rural-urban fringe, but the risks associated
with prescribed ﬁre will induce both fewer prescribed ﬁres and more precaution given that
one is performed.
Precaution costs also aﬀect the use of prescribed ﬁres as a land management tool. Gen-
erally speaking, as the size of a prescribed ﬁre increases, the per-acre cost of precaution
decreases (Cleaves et al. 2000). Furthermore, for any given planned ﬁre size, it is more likely
that a ﬁre will be kept within the borders of larger landholdings of a ﬁre temporarily escapes.
Therefore, more reported escapes are expected where landholdings are small.
Proposition 5. As landholding size increases, the number of escapes decreases.
8The implications of endogenous potential damage have not yet been formally derived.
17Finally, holding precaution and timing constant, it is likely that the probability of escaped
prescribed ﬁres will be highly correlated with the incidence of wildﬁres, simply because fuel
and weather conditions that make wildﬁres more likely will also make prescribed ﬁres more
diﬃcult to control.
Proposition 6. The probability of escaped prescribed ﬁre will be correlated with the proba-
bility of a wildﬁre from other causes.
Liability imposed through the courts is rarely used in isolation. In the terms of the present
topic, Kolstad et al. (1990) show that when a burner is uncertain about how the court will
interpret a negligence rule, ex ante regulation can, under certain reasonable circumstances,
improve the economic eﬃciency of prescribed ﬁre use and precaution. Furthermore, in such
circumstances, ex ante regulation should be set below the eﬃcient level of precaution.
Yoder et al. (2003) review in relative detail the characteristics of negligence rules, and
ﬁnd that they are usually quite vague, leaving a lot of room open for interpretation of the
speciﬁcs of a case. Furthermore, it is diﬃcult to argue that any negligence standards are so
clear as to suggest that if a landowner misses the optimal timing of a ﬁre that he would be
found negligent if a prescribed ﬁre were to be performed later in the vegetation cycle.
In a manner consistent with Kolstad et al. (1990), ex post liability rules are often bolstered
in state statutes by an array of ex ante regulations. Burning permits are often required, burn
bans for certain weather conditions and times of year, and criminal penalties for negligent
burning are often imposed. The use of burn bans is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. They generally
apply only to the time of year in which the risk of escape is highest (often over one summer
month), or imposed intermittently as weather calls for it.
187 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of liability that incorporates the issue of timing and waiting,
and examines the issue of prescribed ﬁre in which there is a risk of escape and damage
to neighboring property. The model is used to develop implications about the incentive
eﬀects of strict liability versus a negligence rule on burner precaution and timing, and victim
incentives. The model is extended to examine the importance of prescribed ﬁre as a wildﬁre
mitigation tool.
A number of implications follow from the model. In general, although a strictly deﬁned
negligence rule that pinpoints the appropriate timing of risky action can induce eﬃcient tim-
ing behavior, a Learned Hand negligence rule, which is arguably more feasibly implemented
by the courts, leads to excessively long prescribed ﬁre rotations. When prescribed ﬁre can
be used to mitigate the risk of wildﬁres, strict liability on prescribed ﬁre use tends to lead to
shorter prescribed ﬁre rotations unless the vegetation has already reached a mature stage,
in which case strict liability leads to excessive waiting or no prescribed ﬁre use at all even
if eﬃciency dictates it should be used. Negligence rules, on the other hand, tends to induce
too much prescribed ﬁre use, and excessively long rotation lengths.
A great deal of research and data are needed to better understand the tradeoﬀs associated
with prescribed ﬁre use. Little information is available about the extent of damage associated
with prescribed ﬁre in the aggregate, or even the fraction of prescribed ﬁres that do become
out of control. Nowhere in this analysis is the number of prescribed ﬁres actually relied upon.
These data may soon be available for a few recent years, but again they will be in aggregate
form and not directly related to the data on wildﬁres originating as prescribed ﬁres. Just as
importantly, the beneﬁts of prescribed ﬁre are only now beginning to be understood, and to
some extent rediscovered.
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